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Extendemos el modelo básico de evasión fiscal a una economía con varios periodos que exhiba crecimiento soste-
nido. Cuando los individuos ocultan parte de su verdadera renta a la autoridad fiscal se enfrentan al riesgo de ser
inspeccionados y, por consiguiente, de pagar la multa correspondiente. Los impuestos y las multas determinan el
ahorro individual y la tasa de acumulación del capital. Demostramos que, si la multa que se impone a los defrauda-
dores es proporcional al importe de los impuestos evadidos, entonces la tasa de crecimiento decrece con el tipo
impositivo. Sin embargo, la relación entre crecimiento y el tipo impositivo se convierte en no monótona cuando la
multa se impone sobre la cantidad de renta evadida.
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1. Introduction to the Tax Evasion Problem
In this paper we analyze how the rate of economic growth and the fraction of income
declared by taxpayers vary with the tax rate on income. Yitzhaki (1974) in a very influen-
tial paper considered a static economy where the penalties were proportional to the amount
of evaded taxes and individual preferences exhibited decreasing absolute risk aversion. In
this context, Yitzhaki showed that an increase in the tax rate results in a smaller amount of
unreported income. However, a positive relation between tax rate levels and evasion has
been documented by several empirical studies (see Clotfelter, 1983; Crane and Nourzad,
1987; Poterba, 1987; and Joulfaian and Rider, 1996). In order to reconcile theory with
empirical evidence, many papers have tried to generate that positive relationship through
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Gordon (1988) consider a framework where taxpayers take into account the provision of
public goods. Landskroner et al. (1990) add to the basic model the possibility of investing
in financial assets and, thus, the tax evasion decision is embedded in a more general port-
folio selection problem. Panadés (2001) builds a Ricardian framework where the tax eva-
sion implications of an increase in the tax rate are independent of the crowding out effect.
Lee (2001) considers the possibility of self-insurance against possible penalties. Chen
(2003) introduces transaction costs associated with tax evasion. Finally, Panadés (2004)
departs from the standard model by making taxpayers’ utility depend on the relative tax
contribution.
We will consider a capital accumulation model where individuals have to choose in each
period the amount of wealth they want to consume and the amount of income they report to
the tax agency. The tax agency audits taxpayers with some exogenous probability and, if a
taxpayer is caught evading, he must pay the corresponding fine. As a by-product, the pre-
vious individual choices determine the total amount of productive investment, which in turn
determines the stock of capital (or wealth) in the next period.
Obviously, the amount of unreported income decreases with the tax rate in this dynamic
scenario when fines are imposed on the amount of evaded taxes and the preferences of all
the individuals of the economy are represented by the typical isoelastic Bernoulli utility defi-
ned on consumption, with  . The intuitive arguments for this result are 
basically those of the static theory of portfolio selection. Let y be the income of an indi-
vidual, x is the amount of voluntarily reported income,  is the flat tax rate on inco-
me,  is the probability of being audited by the tax enforcement agency, and 
is the proportional penalty imposed on the amount of evaded taxes when a taxpayer is caught
evading.1 Therefore, consumption turns out to be a random variable taking the value 
with probability p and with  probability  . Let 
be the amount of income concealed from the tax authority. Therefore, the final disposable
income is  , where  is a random variable whose probability function is 
(1.1)
Note that  . We assume that
(1.2)
which amounts to have  , as is customary in the tax evasion literature to guarantee
that some evasion takes place. A taxpayer solves thus the following problem: 
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68 JORDI CABALLÉ Y JUDITH PANADÉSwhich, after making an affine transformation, is equivalent to 
(1.3)
Note that the previous problem can be viewed as one of selecting the amount  invested
in a risky asset with random return  . Since  , we know that the agent will invest
some positive amount in the risky asset, that is,  or, equivalently,  . As τ increa-
ses, the argument of the Bernoulli utility function in (1.3) decreases for a given level e of
evasion. Since the isoelastic utility displays decreasing absolute risk aversion, an increase in
τ makes individuals more risk averse, and this obviously implies that the optimal amount e
invested in the risky asset should decrease (see Arrow, 1970; and Pratt, 1964). In fact,
Yitzhaki (1974) already proved that the negative relationship between the amount e of inco-
me concealed from the tax authority and the tax rate τ holds for all the utilities displaying a
decreasing index of absolute risk aversion. Finally, since the value function associated with
an isoelastic Bernoulli function is also isoelastic (see Hakansson, 1970), the argument based
on the relation between the behavior of the index of absolute risk aversion and individual risk
taking should also apply to a dynamic context. In other words, the sign of the relationship
between wealth and amount invested in risky asset is preserved in multi-period models of
portfolio selection.
In this article we will also discuss the growth implications of changes in taxpayers’beha-
vior due to variations in the tax rate. In particular, we will see that, when penalties are impo-
sed proportionally to the amount of evaded taxes, a higher tax rate results in less income avai-
lable to purchase new capital. Therefore, the economy ends up growing at a slower rate when
the tax rate increases.
We will show however that, if the penalty rate is imposed on the amount of unreported
income rather than on the amount of evaded taxes (as in Allingham and Sandmo, 1972), then
the amount of income concealed from the tax authority increases with the tax rate. This is so
because no income effect is present in this scenario. Therefore, an increase in the tax rate just
raises the relative cost of honesty and this could result in a larger amount of income conce-
aled from the tax enforcement agency. Moreover, we will see that in this case it is possible
to generate a rate of economic growth that is locally increasing in the tax rate. However, we
should note that the penalty structure assumed by Allingham and Sandmo is much less appe-
aling in empirical grounds since it is at odds with the provisions of existing tax codes.
In the next section we develop the basic model with penalties proportional to the amount
of evaded taxes. This exercise illustrates the robustness of Yitzhaki’s analysis. In Section 3
we consider the case where the proportional penalties are imposed on the amount of unre-
xy < e > 0


















































Tax Rates, Tax Evasion, and Growth in a Multi-period Economy 69ported income. We will discuss in Section 4 the implications of changes in the tax rate for
the rate of economic growth in both cases. The last section concludes the paper.
2. Fines Proportional to the Amount of Evaded Taxes
Let us consider a dynamic competitive economy in discrete time with a continuum of ex-
ante identical individuals lying on the interval  . Each individual  has access to a
technology represented by the net production function  with  , where
is the net output and  is the amount of capital he owns in period t.2 Output can be
devoted to either consumption or investment. After production has taken place, the individual
decides both his consumption  and the amount  of declared income, and then he
pays the corresponding income tax at the flat rate  . If he is inspected by the tax
enforcement agency, the total amount of unreported income is discovered and the taxpayer
has to pay a penalty at the flat rate  , which is imposed on the amount of evaded taxes
(as in Yitzhaki, 1974). Inspection of a particular individual is an event that occurs with pro-
bability  . The probability of inspection p and the penalty rate π satisfy assumption
(1.2) to ensure positive tax evasion. Note that, even if there is no uncertainty about the out-
put produced by an individual (since the initial capital and the audit history of an individual
is common knowledge), an audit by the agency is necessary in order to certify indisputably
the level of income of a given household.
In the next section we will assume instead that the penalty rate  is imposed on the
amount of unreported income (as in Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) and, thus, is independent
of the tax rate. Note however that in both scenarios the audit probability is assumed to be
independent of both the current amount of reported income and the history of reports and
audits of each taxpayer. This simplifying assumption allows us to focus on the growth impli-
cations of imposing penalty rates either on the amount of evaded taxes or on the amount of
evaded income. Note that a variation in the tax rate only affects the cost of honesty in the lat-
ter case, whereas an increase in the tax rate τ raises the cost of both honesty and cheating in
the former case. Moreover, audit strategies that depend on the past audit history and on the
taxpayers’ reports are characterized under an explicit objective of the tax enforcement
agency, like the maximization of either the amount of government revenues or of taxpayers’
welfare. However, we do not make explicit the maximization problem of the agency and we
take instead as given the values of the instruments chosen by the agency so as to keep the
setup as close as possible to Yitzhaki (1974) and Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Then, we
proceed to evaluate the growth implications of their alternative penalty structures.
The amount of output remaining after consumption has taken place and taxes and
(potential) penalties have been paid by a consumer i constitutes his net investment, which is
added to the capital stock  that he owned at the beginning of period t. The resulting stock
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whereas the budget constraint of a non-audited individual is 
. (2.2)
We assume that the amount of taxes collected by the tax agency is devoted to finance a
government spending gt that takes the form of non-excludable public good. According to the
law of large numbers, the budget constraint of the government in per capita terms is the follo-
wing: 
,
where  and  are the aggregate amounts of capital and repor-
ted income, respectively, in period t. We assume that gt enters into the instantaneous utility
of individuals in an additive way. Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution of private con-
sumption between two arbitrary periods is not affected by the level of government spending.
Moreover, under this additive specification, government spending does not affect the margi-
nal rate of substitution of consumption in the two states of the nature within the same period,
namely, when the individual is audited and when he is not. Individuals are thus assumed to
maximize the following discounted sum of instantaneous utilities taking as given the path
of government spending per capita: 
, (2.3)
where  is the discount factor. Following most of the growth literature and in order
to obtain simple equilibrium equations, we use the logarithmic functional form for the ins-
tantaneous utility accruing from private consumption,  However, the
model can be generalized to an isoelastic utility function with non-unitary index of relative
risk aversion as follows from the discussion in Section 1. Moreover, recall that logarithmic
preferences yield a saving rate that is independent of the interest rate, which agrees with the
empirical evidence. Finally, note that the additive utility accruing from government spending
can be suppressed from the consumers’objective function since consumers take as given the
path of gt.3
The amount of unreported income of individual  in period  is 
.
Hence, we can use the previous budget constraints (2.1) and (2.2) to write the law of
motion of capital per capita as
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, (2.4)
where  is an idiosyncratic i.i.d. random variable having the probability function
(2.5)
and, hence,  for all  .
The Bellman equation for the stochastic dynamic problem faced by individual i is
, (2.6)
where  satisfies (2.4) and the operator Et is the conditional expectation given the infor-
mation available at the beginning of period t. It is well known that the value function for this
problem is an affine transformation of the logarithmic function, 
with  (see Hakansson, 1970). Therefore, using (2.4) and computing the conditional
expectation  , the optimization problem faced by the taxpayer i who has an
amount of capital  at the beginning of period t, becomes
where the variable  is the after-tax wealth of an honest taxpayer, which is given by
. (2.7)
Differentiating with respect to  and  we obtain the following first order condi-
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Using the expressions for  and  we have just obtained, the Bellman equation
(2.6) becomes 









It is then clear that the individual amount  of unreported income is decreasing in
the tax rate τ for a given value of  which is consistent with the original result obtained
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which is also decreasing in the tax rate. Note that the consumption policy (2.11) is exactly
the same as the policy obtained when the tax evasion phenomenon is disregarded. The latter
case is easily derived by making  so that  (see (2.12)). In fact, the parameters
p and π characterizing the tax enforcement policy do not have any effect on the amount of
consumption in period t for given values of both the tax rate τ and the capital stock  (see
(2.11)). Therefore, the impact of a variation in the tax enforcement policy is totally absorbed
by the amount of unreported income.
3. Fines Proportional to the Amount of Unreported Income
In their seminal paper, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) introduced the portfolio approach
to solve the static tax evasion problem, and they assumed that the penalties imposed on
caught evaders were independent of the tax rate. Therefore, in their paper the flat penalty rate
was imposed on the amount of unreported income rather than on the amount of evaded taxes.
It should be mentioned that this specification of the penalty structure is much less realistic
than the one assumed by Yitzhaki (1974) since to our knowledge all the tax codes around the
world impose penalties that depend on the amount of evaded taxes rather than on the amount
of concealed income. The optimal amount of unreported income obtained in the previous
section can be easily transformed to cope with this alternative assumption. Letting  be the
penalty rate on unreported income, we have that  . Therefore, after replacing π by
, the policy function (2.12) becomes 
. (3.1)
Note that the consumption policy (2.11) is not affected by this alternative assumption on
the penalty structure.
Even if Allingham and Sandmo found that the effect of changes in the tax rate on unre-
ported income was ambiguous for general concave utility functions, the derivative of et(i)
with respect to τ can be unambiguously signed in the present context under some parametric
restrictions. The assumption (1.2) becomes  in the present context. Moreover, in
order to account for effective punishment to evaders, we assumed that  which now
becomes  . Finally, we make the empirically reasonable assumption that the total fine
to be paid by evaders does not exceed the amount of concealed income, that is,  .4
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74 JORDI CABALLÉ Y JUDITH PANADÉSClearly, the term S is strictly positive as  , whereas the term Q can be rewritten as 
. (3.2)
The denominator of the first term of the previous sum is positive since  and the
numerator satisfies
,
where the first inequality comes again from the fact that  , while the last inequality arises
since  . Finally, the second term of the sum (3.2) is positive since  and  .
Therefore, under our plausible parametric restrictions, an increase in the tax rate results in a lar-
ger amount of income concealed from the tax authority. This is so because, when the fine impo-
sed on evaders is independent of the tax rate, an increase in τ makes honesty more expensive,
while the cost of evasion remains unchanged. Obviously, the amount τ et (i) of evaded taxes is
now increasing in the tax rate τ for a given value of the current stock of capital kt (i). 
The comparative statics result we have just obtained is empirically more plausible than
that of Section 2. However, as we have already acknowledged, the result of this section is
obtained under a less realistic assumption on the penalty structure.
Finally, let us point out that the sign of comparative statics exercise performed in this
section agrees with that obtained by Yaniv (1994) in a static setup. This author showed that
the amount of income concealed from the tax authority is increasing in the tax rate when the
utility function is isoelastic with an index σ of relative risk aversion satisfying  .
This assumption is clearly met in our model since our logarithmic utility function involves a
unitary index of relative risk aversion, i.e.,  .
4. Growth Implications of Changes in the Tax Rate
In order to analyze the effect of tax rate changes on the rate of economic growth when
fines are proportional to the amount of evaded taxes, we should first compute the aggregate
amount of capital in period  , which is given from (2.4) by
where the second equality follows from the independence between the variables  and 
at the beginning of period t whereas the last equality comes from the law of large numbers for
a continuum of i.i.d. random variables, according to which 
and from the definition of aggregate consumption,  . cc i d i t = ∫ []() , 01
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. (4.1)










We have already showed that higher tax rates are associated with lower evasion levels.
Thus, fewer resources are available for capital accumulation, which implies in turn that the
economy ends up growing at a lower rate when fines are proportional to the amount of eva-
ded taxes.
If we consider instead the framework proposed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) with
penalties independent of the tax rate, the growth rate (4.2) will become 
.
Note that when τ gets close to zero, the rate of growth approaches infinity, and the
same occurs when τ tends to its upper bound  . This means that γ is a non-monotonic
function of the tax rate, and, in particular, it is decreasing for small values of τ , whereas it
is increasing for large values of τ . Since tax evasion is encouraged by higher tax rates in
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76 JORDI CABALLÉ Y JUDITH PANADÉScould result in more resources available for acquisition of capital and, hence, in higher
growth rates. Therefore, the reduction in reported income could outweigh the typical nega-
tive effect of flat rate taxes on capital accumulation (see, among many others, Rebelo,
1991).
Our last results tell us that, if the penalty rate is independent of the tax rate then an incre-
ase in the tax rate might be growth enhancing. Note that this result is just positive and no
normative conclusions can be inferred from it. Since more taxes are evaded, the potential
provision of public goods becomes smaller so that total individual welfare is affected in a
way that depends on the relative weight attached to government spending in the agents’pre-
ferences.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the negative theoretical relationship between unrepor-
ted income and tax rates is preserved in a multi-period economy when fines are imposed on
the amount of evaded taxes. However, under the assumption that the fine paid by caught eva-
ders is proportional to the amount of evaded income, the sign of the previous relation is
reversed.
Concerning the rate of economic growth when fines are proportional to the amount of
evaded taxes, we have shown that the rate of capital accumulation cannot increase with the
tax rate, since the amount of disposable income always decreases in this case. However, if
fines are imposed on the amount of unreported income, then the larger evasion triggered by
higher tax rates could increase the amount of disposable income and, thus, capital could be
purchased at a faster pace.
We have considered a capital accumulation model with very simple features aimed at
highlighting the main point of the paper. Among the simplifying assumptions that could be
relaxed we could mention the fact that all the individuals exhibit the same preferences and,
thus, the same attitude towards risk; the fact that audit probabilities are independent of the
income voluntarily reported by taxpayers (see Reinganum and Wilde, 1985, 1986; and
Caballé and Panadés, 2005; for different approaches that relax this assumption); the lack of
strategic interaction between taxpayers and the tax enforcement agency so that phenomena
like reputation and learning are absent; and finally that government spending is assumed to
be totally unproductive. Concerning the last aspect, we should mention that the case where
government spending is used as a productive input (as in Barro, 1990) has been analyzed in
a related paper (Caballé and Panadés, 1997). We should point out however that the compa-
rative statics results concerning the relation between tax evasion and tax rates obtained in the
present paper also hold under this alternative assumption on the role of government spen-
ding.
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1. If the penalty rate π were smaller than one, evading taxpayers would never be punished.
2. See Rebelo (1991) for a model where the Ak production function arises endogenously when physical and
human capitals are perfect substitutes. In this case the capital stock k embodies both kinds of capital.
3. Our assumptions on the role of public spending is standard in the growth models when this spending is non-
productive. For alternative assumptions appearing in the theory of public goods provision, see Cowell and
Gordon (1988).
4. Note that any reasonable calibration of the model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) will yield  .
Therefore, implies  that  .
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Abstract
We extend the basic tax evasion model to a multi-period economy exhibiting sustained growth. When individuals
conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the
corresponding fine. Both taxes and fines determine individual saving and the rate of capital accumulation. We show
that, if the penalty imposed on tax evaders is proportional to the amount of evaded taxes, then the growth rate is
decreasing in the tax rate. However, the relationship between growth and tax rate becomes non-monotonic when the
penalty rate is imposed on the amount of evaded income.
Key words: Tax evasion, Growth.
JEL classification: H26, E62, O41
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